Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are vulnerable to network attacks because communication relies on the network that links the various components in the CPS. The importance of network security is selfevident. In this study, we conduct a network security risk assessment from the perspectives of the host and the network, and we propose a new framework for a multidimensional network security risk assessment that includes two stages, i.e., risk identification and risk calculation. For the risk identification stage, we propose a multidimensional hierarchical index system for assessing cybersecurity risk; the system's security status is determined in three dimensions, i.e., basic operation, vulnerabilities, and threats, and these dimensions guide the data collection. In the risk calculation stage, we use a hidden Markov model (HMM) to assess the network security risk. We provide a new definition of the quality of alert and optimize the observation sequence of the HMM. The model uses a learning algorithm instead of setting the parameters manually. We introduce the concept of network node association to increase the reliability and accuracy of the risk assessment. The simulation results show that the proposed index system provides quantitative data that reflect the security status of the network. The proposed network security risk assessment method based on the improved HMM (I-HMM) reflects the security risk status in a timely and intuitive manner and detects the degree of risk that different hosts pose to the network.
security risk threats [24] , quantifying the risk status and using the assessment results to guide risk control and defense [25] .
Establishing a quantifiable and operational indicator system for network security risk is the premise and basis for quantitative risk analysis; this indicator system affects the analysis results, the comprehensiveness of the analysis and the effectiveness of the outcome. In contrast to other research [26] [27] [28] , we propose a multidimensional hierarchical indicator system for assessing network security risk. The indicator system determines the security status in three dimensions including basic operation, vulnerabilities, and threats. All indicators have realistic meanings. In this indicator system, we provide quantitative methods for indicators; the collection and calculation of indicators are relatively simple; we can obtain the quantitative evaluation results.
In the risk identification stage, we collect data related to specific indicators and calculate the indicators in each dimension. We propose an improved hidden Markov model (I-HMM) for risk assessment in the risk calculation stage. The I-HMM method overcomes the problems of manually setting the model parameters and calculating risk from only one perspective [29] , [30] , i.e., the host or the network. The method considers the host and network layer. In the host layer dimension, the HMM is used to determine the change in the security status of the host. We optimize the observation sequence of the HMM. The model uses a learning algorithm to set the parameters. The network security risk of the host is obtained by calculating the probability of the host in each security state. In the network layer dimension, the network node association between hosts is used to determine the indirect risk of the nodes in the network. Finally, the security risk values of the host layer and the network layer are combined to obtain an overall security risk value for the network. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method has high applicability and accuracy for predicting network risk.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the multidimensional hierarchical indicator system for assessing network security risk in the three dimensions. Section III describes the acquisition of the observation sequence and the parameter estimation algorithm of the I-HMM. Section IV introduces the fundamentals of network node association. Section V presents the calculation of the network security risk value. Section VI describes the experimental environment and a comparison of the simulation results obtained from different algorithms. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. MULTIDIMENSIONAL HIERARCHICAL NETWORK INDICATOR SYSTEM FOR SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT
The indicator system reflects the assessment objectives and perspectives on cybersecurity risk assessment of the network manager and affects the application scope and assessment results. We propose a multidimensional hierarchical indicator system for assessing network security risk. This system indicates the security status of a network from three dimensions, including basic operation, vulnerabilities, and threats. These three dimensions cover the various parts that comprise the network and reflect the network security status. We use quantitative index data that describe the status of each network dimension. The network security risk assessment value R is a comprehensive indicator that considers various factors. The value is obtained after conducting a quantitative evaluation of the different dimensions, i.e., the basic operation dimension C, the vulnerability dimension V , and the threat dimension T . The value is defined as
The basic operation dimension reflects the current operating state of the network. The vulnerability dimension indicates the possibility of the network being attacked and the amount of loss. The threat dimension reflects threats to the network and is determined by collecting information on various security incidents that occurred in the network.
A. INDICATOR OF THE BASIC OPERATION DIMENSION
This dimension reflects the current operating state of the network. The basic dimension indicators are shown in Fig. 1 .
The asset value is obtained by conducting a comprehensive assessment that considers the asset assignment levels of confidentiality (C), integrity (I ), and availability (A). The value of the host asset is calculated as follows:
The service status reflects the various service statuses in the system. We use the opensource tool Nagios to monitor the services provided by the host. The tool categorizes the service status of the host into three cases: ''OK'', ''Warning'', and ''Critical'', where ''OK'' indicates a normal status, ''Warning'' indicates an alarm state, and ''Critical'' indicates a crisis state. The three service statuses are assigned scores. The score of the host service status is Ser_Score, as shown in Table 1 .
The host status value is calculated as follows:
The network status reflects the traffic load in the network. Ntop is used to monitor the data packets that are sent and received by the host in realtime and obtain the traffic status of the host and network. The average flow (AVF) indicates the average of the number of packets sent and received by the host during a time period. The peak flow (PF) is the maximum traffic in the network at a given time. The bandwidth availability ratio (BAR) is a percentage of the network bandwidth. The network state is computed as follows:
Based on the basic operation dimension, the importance value c h of the host h is calculated as follows:
B. INDICATOR OF THE VULNERABILITY DIMENSION
The specific indicator items are shown in Fig. 2 . The indicators and quantized value of the availability (AVL) are shown in Table 2 . The safety risks, including confidentiality, integrity, and usability, are shown in Table 3 . The indicators and scores of the countermeasures are shown in Table 4 .
The comprehensive quantitative assessment of the vulnerability dimension is computed as follows:
V _Score = (AVL +SafetyRisk +Countermeasure)/3 AVL = 2 * AV * AC * Au
The greater the importance of the host, the greater the vulnerability is, and the greater the risk loss is. Therefore, we use (6) to calculate the importance of the host. 
C. INDICATOR OF THE THREAT DIMENSION
We use the open-source security tool Snort to detect and collect security incident information and obtain statistics of the incidents to determine the threat dimension value. The indicators of the threat dimension are shown in Fig. 3 . The alert frequency (AF) represents the relative number of occurrences of a specific alert type per unit time. Generally, during an attack, a large number of the same alarm types will occur in a short period of time, i.e., the attack behavior in the network can be characterized by the frequency of alerts. AF = number of ith alarms/number of all alarms (7) Alert criticality (AC) refers to the potential of the change in the network security status. The higher the AC, the greater the possibility is that a change in network security status will occur. If a new alarm occurs during monitoring, it indicates that a new attack has occurred in the network, and the new attack increases the possibility of a change in the network security status. Therefore, the time of occurrence of the alarm can be used to indicate the AC. The AC is divided into three categories depending on the time of the alarm: 1) occurrence in the current acquisition cycle; 2) occurrence in the previous N acquisition cycles; 3) no occurrence in the previous N acquisition cycles, where 1, 2, and 3 refer to the degree of AC. We use N = 3 for the acquisition cycles.
Alert severity (AS) indicates the extent to which the attack affects the security status of the system. The higher the value, the greater the impact on the security status is, and the greater the potential is for a change in the security status. The AS value is calculated as follows:
The threat dimension collects the alarm information of the intrusion detection system (IDS). In the risk assessment stage, these data are used as the input for the HMM.
III. I-HMM MODEL PARAMETERS A. OBSERVATION SEQUENCE
IDSs tend to generate large amounts of alarm data during network system operation, but not all alarm messages are useful and a percentage is false or irrelevant. A large amount of alarm information makes it difficult to obtain an observation sequence as input for the HMM. We propose an improvement of the definition of the quality of the alarm put forward in [31] to assess the accuracy of the alarm data and determine the security status of the network. The quality of the alert (QoA) describes the degree of the threat posed to the system. The higher the QoA, the greater the impact of the security incident is on the security status of the system, and the more effective the network security risk assessment must be.
We establish a hierarchical analysis model. The alarm quality index is affected by the AF, AC, andAS. The specific steps are as follows.
1. Construct the comparison matrix, A.
The risk assessment matrix is obtained by conducting a pairwise comparison of the factors.
2. Check the hierarchical sorting and consistency. The weight vector (W ) is (0.1365, 0.2385, 0.625). The maximum eigenvalue of matrix λ_max is 3.054, the consistency index (CI) is 0.00945, the average random consistency index (RI) corresponding to the third order is 0.58, and the consistency ratio (CR) is 0.047, which satisfies CR ≤ 0.1. Therefore, the matrix A passes the consistency check, and W can be used as the weight vector.
The calculation formula for the QoA is (10) .
The observation vector is calculated as follows:
B. PARAMETER ESTIMATION ALGORITHM
We want to avoid having to set the HMM parameters manually because it requires expert knowledge; therefore, it is necessary to solve the learning problem of the network security risk assessment model. We use the modified equation of the Baum-Welch algorithm to address this issue [32] : Baum et al. proposed the forward-backward algorithm to reduce the computational complexity of P(O | λ) and defined the forward probability α t (i) and the backward probability β t (i). α t (i) is defined as the probability that the previous observation sequence is
The recursive process is as follows: Initialization:
Recursion:
End:
A similar definition of the backward probability β t (i) is as follows:
Using the definitions of the forward and backward probabilities, we define the observed sequence probability P (O | λ) in (21) .
The learning problem of the model is to obtain λ to maximize P (O | λ), which is a functional extremum problem. VOLUME 8, 2020 The Baum-Welch algorithm uses the concept of recursion to ensure that P (O | λ) is locally maximal and then obtains the model parameters.
In the Baum-Welch algorithm, ξ t (ij) represents the probability of being in the S i state at time t and the S j state at time t + 1 for a given model λ and observation sequence O.
The Markov chain probability at S i in time t is expressed in (23) .
represents the expected transition value at the initial state S i , and T−1 t=1 ξ t (i, j) indicates the expected transition value from the S i to the S j state. Then, we can derive the modified equation of the Baum-Welch algorithm.
The new model parameters are obtained from the modified equation. In practical applications, the parameter estimation algorithm does not require labeled sample data because it is an unsupervised learning algorithm. The maximized probability model is obtained using continuous iterations, although the result may be the local optimum rather than the global optimum.
IV. NETWORK NODE ASSOCIATION A. NODE ASSOCIATION DEFINITION
When assessing network security risks, it is not sufficient to consider only the host risk. Since a host association exists in the network, there is an interaction between the hosts from the perspectives of physics and logic. The network risk can be regarded as risk consisting of the host risk and the risk resulting from the interaction between the hosts. In the network security risk assessment, the assessment accuracy is higher if we consider the correlation between the nodes in the network layer.
The correlation between the network nodes refers to a special access relationship between the network nodes. In this relationship, one party has control over the resources of the other party, and this relationship is unique to both parties. Not all nodes have this special relationship. As a result, when an attacker successfully invades node A in the network, he not only controls part or all of the resources of A, but also has certain access privileges to node B associated with A due to the special access relationship. Therefore, the attack effect may be unknown and cause an incalculable loss to the system.
The definitions related to the network node correlation (NNC) are as follows:
Component: A device in a network information system is called a node, and the user, operating system, and the application level or service on the network node are referred to as the main body. The pair (n, s) consisting of the network node n and the main body s is called a component on the node and is denoted as C ns .
NNC: If an attacker successfully attacks the network node A using a component C Ai on A to access the component C Bj on node B to attack node B, the available accessibility is called the NNC of component C Ai to C Bj .
B. NODE CORRELATION CLASSIFICATION AND QUANTIFICATION
The proposed NNC emphasizes a logical relationship between the components of each node with special access rights; therefore, we focus on the classification of the NNC to determine the degree of influence. The influence degree of the NNC is divided into 7 categories represented by the set W = {W 1 , . . . , W 7 }. The NNC classification scheme and the quantitative descriptions are shown in Table 5 .
V. CALCULATION OF THE NETWORK SECURITY RISK VALUE
Cyber risk consists of direct risk and indirect risk. When calculating the risk value of a host (h) in the network, it is necessary to consider the NNC between the network nodes [33] . In addition to the direct risk (DR) to the host from the host layer dimension, there is also the potential risk in the network layer dimension [34] . This is called the host's indirect risk (IR).
After obtaining the probability of the nodes in each security risk state, the DR is calculated as follows:
ρ t is the probability distribution of the host security status at a given time. The calculation algorithm is shown in Table 6 . w i is the risk weight vector of each risk state.
The calculation steps for the IR are as follows: 1. Find the node associated with the host. The corresponding nodes are then denoted as h 1 , h 2 , . . ., h N . (If N = 0, there is no need to calculate IR.)
2. Determine the host NNC relationship type W h k ,h of each associated node h k (1 ≤ k ≤ N) and the corresponding quantized value σ (W h k ,h ).
3. The risk value is R h k , 1 ≤ k ≤ N for every node. If the effect on the risk value of the host by each node in the NNC relationship is R h k , 1 ≤ k ≤ N, then R h k is calculated as follows: The maximum value of R h k is used as an indicator to measure the influence of all associated nodes on the risk value of the host. IR h is calculated as follows:
In this step, it is more realistic to select the maximum value to calculate IR h . The reason is that in an actual network, assuming a risk value of 100 means that the host has been successfully attacked, and the attacker has administrative rights. A risk value of 50 indicates that the attacker has not successfully attacked the host, and the attacker may have read permission. When the parameters have the following values: R h 1 = 100, σ W h 1 ,h = 1, R h 2 = 10, σ W h 2 ,h = 0.2, we obtain IR h = 51 using arithmetic averaging. This result indicates that the host's network security risk resulting from associated node is only equivalent to the case where the attacker does not succeed completely and only obtains read permission. Since σ W h 1 ,h = 1, the attacker can obtain administrative rights of the host h through the host h 1 to attack host h successfully, which matches the result that we use the maximum value method to obtain the value, i.e., IR h = 100. Therefore, the maximum value method is more accurate for reflecting the security risk of the associated node on the host h, and corresponds well to real-life conditions. 5. Calculate the overall risk value.
The weighting function f (x) is selected to weight the DR and IR to obtain the final network security risk value. The NNC can be regarded as a special logical relationship with permissions [35] . Therefore, when the NNC value is greater than 0.5, the node has greater authority over the host, which means there is also a greater impact on the host [36] . Under these circumstances, the risk value of the host consists of IR. When the NNC value is less than 0.5, it indicates that the node has no significant influence on the host, and the host's risk value consists of DR. The weighting function f (x) has the following properties:
The weighting function is defined in (32) .
Therefore, the risk value is computed as follows:
σ (W h k ,h ) represents the quantized value of the relationship with the host that has the greatest influence on the host.
Finally, the overall risk value of the network is calculated using (35) , where v h is the relative importance of the host.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

A. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
We establish an ordinary local area network. The network environment includes three subnetworks, namely, an internal user area, an internal management area, and an external service area. The subnetworks are separated by a firewall. The external service area includes a web server and an e-mail server, which provides web services and email services, respectively. The internal management area includes an FTP file server, a SQL server database server, a MySQL database server, and two hosts. The file server provides file storage and management, and the SQL Server database server provides the database server services for the web server. The MySQL database server provides database services to the email server, and the two hosts connect to and operate the file server through SSH. The internal user area provides no services and uses services from other areas [37] . The programs installed on each server or host and the main services are shown in Table 7 .
The network communication rules between each server and the host are configured through a firewall [38] . The network is divided into three areas. The access relationship between each node is shown in Table 8 .
We scan the nodes in the network using the vulnerability scanning tool Nessus [39] and use this tool to obtain the network's vulnerability information, as shown in Table 9 .
B. EXPERIMENTAL DATA COLLECTION AND PROCESSING
The network's web server node is used as an example to calculate the risk value; the similar methods and steps can be applied to the other nodes.
We use existing attack files [40] . The type, description, and priority in Snort are shown in Table 10 .
The severity of the attacks differs in the four phases but the frequency of the attacks remains the same. We send 1,500 packets within two hours. 
1) INDICATORS OF THE THREE DIMENSIONS
We calculate the state index of the host and the network and the importance of the host c h using the proposed method. Then we obtain the observation value of the acquisition cycle using the threat dimension and the observation sequence.
The host's assets generally do not change over time in the system. Asset identification is performed on the web server and the asset value is 4.1. With an acquisition cycle of five minutes, we collect index data for each dimension.
2) MODEL PARAMETER TRAINING
We adopt the model parameter setting proposed in a previous study [31] to determine the state transition matrix (T ), the probability distribution matrix (O) of the observation vector, the probability distribution matrix of the initial state (π ), and the risk weight vector (w i ). We use the Python hmmlearn package to estimate and optimize the initial parameters of the model. After 35 iterations, the value of ln P(O | λ) converges.
3) COMPARISON OF ALGORITHM PERFORMANCE
We use the experimental network environment and configuration and determine the nodes that have an NNC with the web server. These are shown in Table 11 .
The IR value is calculated according to the NNC relationship, and the DR value is obtained from the HMM; the values are combined to calculate the node's security risk value.
We obtain the observation sequence to compare changes in the web server's risk value using three methods. The method proposed in [31] obtains observation vectors based on the alarm quality and uses a game method to determine the state transition matrix. The method proposed in [39] obtains the observation sequence randomly and solves the uncertainty of the alarm information based on the characteristics of a statistical model. The third method is the proposed I-HMM method. The comparison results are shown in Fig. 4 . The trends of the web server's security risk are similar for the three methods. However, the method proposed in [39] cannot obtain effective data source due to the random acquisition of the observation sequence in the HMM. The state transition matrix in this model is based on an empirical value and does not objectively reflect the changes in the security status. The accuracy of this method is the lowest among the three methods. The method proposed in [31] improves the validity of the data source. The game approach used in the method for determining the security incidents and protection measures provides good results for the transfer matrix considering the probability of attack success. However, in the 8th, 12th, and 13th sampling periods, there are significant differences in the risk values obtained from the method proposed in [31] and our method. In addition, the change rates are also significantly different. This result demonstrates that the use of the NNC results in a change in the risk value of host 1 that correlates with the web server. This change has a significant effect on the web server's risk status. Between the 14th and 20th sampling periods, the security risk value obtained by our method is much lower than that of the other two algorithms. Most of the attack degrees were level 2 attacks. The risk status should be similar in the first five sampling cycles; therefore, the risk value obtained from the proposed I-HMM method is in agreement with the actual conditions.
Similarly, the security risk value of the other nodes in the network can be calculated. A comparison of the network's security risk values for the three methods is shown in Fig. 5 .
The trends are similar for the three methods. However, the I-HMM method has a greater obvious rate of change. This result is attributed to the use of the node association in the calculation of the overall security risk value of the network. In the proposed method, the IR and relative importance of the nodes are considered, and the risk values of these nodes can cause significant changes to the risk value of the entire network.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this study, we divided the network security risk assessment into risk identification and risk calculation. We proposed a multidimensional hierarchical indicator system for assessing network security risk in three dimensions. Specific indicators were used and quantitative values were determined. The proposed risk assessment method based on the I-HMM calculated the network security risk value of the host layer and the network layer. We provided a new definition for the QoA, optimized the acquisition of the observation sequences, and used the Baum-Welch algorithm to obtain the model parameters to improve parameter acquisition. The use of this method improved the accuracy of network security risk assessment in the network layer due to the incorporation of network node association and the consideration of risks associated with the nodes. The results obtained from a simulation environment indicated that the proposed multidimensional hierarchical index system provided quantitative data that reflected the actual security status. The risk assessment method based on the I-HMM was highly effective and accurately showed the security risk status of the network. The proposed method proved more sensitive than other methods and provided a better indication of dynamic change. The fluctuation in the risk value resulting from a change in the risk status was easier to detect using the proposed method than the traditional methods. We were also able to determine the degree of influence that different hosts had on the network, enabling us to assess changes in the network risk with high precision and efficiency. 
